

WORKING PAPERS 31 October 1952

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON ALBANIA

INFORMATION REQUIRED

- 2. Soviet communist opposition capabilities in the event of a coup.
 - a. Overt opposition.
 - (1) Do Soviet satellite countries adjoining Yugoslavia have the capability of successfully over-running that country without the participation of Soviet armed forces in reprisal for the launching of an anti-Soviet coup in Albania? What is the minimum period of time which adjoining countries would require to prepare and launch a military in-vasion?
 - (2) What is the capability of the Soviet Union and/or satallite countries to provide military assistance for the Soviet controlled regime in Albania? By sea shipments of troops, material and supplies? By air shipment? What time factor would be involved?
 - b. Govert opposition.
 - (1) What are communist capabilities for lemching major paramilitary reprised attacks (revolutionary action) against areas which are allied with or of vital strategic significance to the U.S. as a "face saving" action at the time of a comp in Albania?
 - (2) What are communist capabilities for covert infiltration of arms, material, and "volunteer" forces into Albania during a revolution in that country in order to assist the Seviet controlled regime? By sea? By air? What time factor would be involved? From what major sources and areas could such ocvert assistance be provided by the communists?

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THE SEGLET SECURITY INFORMATION

- 2. Soviet-occumist intentions in regard to an attempted pro-West coup in Albania.
 - a. What are probable Soviet military intentions or reactions in the event of a coup in Albania: in regard to open military intervention by USSR or satellite countries in Albania? In regard to military reprisel attack on Yugoolavia by neighboring satellite countries? In regard to launching open military hostilities in Europe with Soviet and satellite armed forces utilising Albania as a pretext?
 - b. What are probable Soviet intentions or reactions in regard to major paramilitary action in the event of a coup in Albania? With a view to assisting the Soviet controlled regime in Albania? With a view to major reprisel or "face saving" action in other areas?
 - c. What are probable Soviet communist intentions in Europe in regard to political-psychological warfare measures to be taken against the West with a view to discrediting motives of anti-communist forces and offsetting pro-West psychological advantages resulting from a coup? With a view to provoking and extending international tension in the Balkane as a result of conflicting national interests in Albania?
 - d. To what extent would Seviet intentions with regard to 2, a, b and c above be influenced if U.S. participation in a coup became openly apparently through "blowing" of U.S. clandestine operations and support?
 - 3. Yugoslav intentions and capabilities.
 - a. What are Yugoslavia's probable intentions with regard to:-
 - (1) Launching a unilateral coup in Albania to overthrow the Soviet dominated regime in that country? At the present time? In the future?
 - (2) Participating in a comp sponsored multilaterally by Tugoslavia, the U.S. and/or other interested countries?
 - (3) Attempting to establish unilateral Yugoslav political control of any new regime following a successful unilateral coup? Following a multilateral coup participated in by the U.S. and/or other interested countries?

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